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ABSTRACT:
This thesis examines the Venezuelan Industrialization
Process from 1936-1986 and the role that la Corporacion
Venezolana de Guayana (CVG) played in this process. The study
weight the relative position of the main players in this process:
the government, the state-owned enterprises, and the private
sector, in order to understand how these players interact, and
help one to recognize the growing importance of the public
sector.
The current economic crisis is seen as a consequence of the
industrial strategy of import substitution followed by the
Government since 1961, and the emphasis on resource based
industrialization since 1973. CVG and its industrial program for
Ciudad Guayana was found to have played a major role in both
periods.
The thesis describes the political and institutional aspects
of the industrial development coordinated by the state and base
in Guayana since 1973. It explores the idea that the current
industrial strategy is based on previous investments but does not
satisfy the expectations of the private sector.
The thesis concludes that the role of the CVG has to be seen
in close relation to the role of the Social Democratic
governments. The Social Democracy will never abandon the
development of Guayana, because its leaders formulated the idea,
launched the program, and will always feel responsible for its
progress. The party's goals are expressed by the industrial
strategy used to overcome the current economic recession, while
attempting to retain an public image of successful development.
The idea of the state as an engine of growth will not be
sustained by the current strategy followed by CVG if it does not
prove to be the best pathway towards progress and the production
of capital goods.
THE ROLE OF THE GUAYANA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
IN VENEZUELAN INDUSTRIALIZATION:
Diversification or Vertical Integration.
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I) INTRODUCTION:
The purpose of this thesis is to explain the current and
future role of the State's Guayana Development Corporation (CVG)
in the industrialization of Venezuela. In order to understand the
CVG's mission it is necessary to examine recent history,
recognize the main players in the process, identify the players'
strengths and weaknesses and understand how they interact.
We will concentrate on the Guayana Development Corporation,
paying special attention to the political dimension of this
industrialization process and trying to provide some insights
into the strong links between the Social Democratic Party,
"Accion Democratica", the democratic development of Venezuela and
the Guayana Development Corporation. We will see how the success
of Venezuela's democratic process and of the oil industry gave
the Venezuelan government sufficient wealth and power enough to
spur a regional development program in Guayana which went far
beyond the scope of any conservative economic measure. The
dimensions of the projects launched and the difficulties
encountered in their implementation have prevented the region
from becoming a major export center, as was initially projected
for 1980. If it is to become such an export center in the near
future, it will be at a very high cost to the nation.
Today, when financial resources have become scarce as a
result of the decline in oil prices, Venezuelan industrialization
has to accomplish two simultaneous tasks: advance into a next
stage of import substitution and achieve vertical integration of
the oversized Guayana complex. Even with diminished economic
capabilities, the state seeks to promote the reinforcement of the
state-owned enterprises, particularly in Guayana. The private
sector, which supported the state in its industrial strategy of
import substitution, seems skeptical at this point regarding the
state's new strategy. In order to accomplish its industrial
goals, CVG must convince the private sector that real
opportunities exist in the development of Guayana. This would be
proved by showing profits from installed plants, prioritizing and
facilitating future projects, and providing business guarantees
in order to reduce risks for private investors.
From the private sector's point of view, the magnitude of
required investments is still so great that it tends to prefer
diversifying its investments in alternative projects, where it
has greater control and where it is not completely dependent on
the state. In the midst of the worldwide economic uncertainty
prevalent since the 1970's, there is a natural reluctance to
place all investments in one concentrated sector. The Guayana
project has yet to achieve the profitable results that would
encourage the private sector to participate in the process. Also,
CVG is in many ways limited by political factors that influence
the decision-making process in such a way that guarantees made to
private investors remain insufficient, due to the uncertain
nature of that political process.
The Guayana industrial program is also tied to labor
movements, and flexibility must be considered not only in market
terms but also in terms of the labor force. The industrial
specialization mentioned before must also be seen in terms of its
political risks. My research recognized the importance of the
labor movements in Guayana but expressly excluded this variable
as beyond the scope of the thesis.
The interest of this thesis is to point out that, as
occurred in 1958 when an import substitution program gained
impetus, strong new alliances must be formed in order to advance
in a new era of capital goods production and vertical integration
of the state-owned industrial complex with the private sector.
This will lead to the completion of the great export center which
Guayana was meant to be.
2) INDUSTRIALIZATION IN VENEZUELA:
What we expect to discover in this first part of the thesis
is the historical interrelation between the state, the political
parties and the private sector. Accion Democratica, the
principal party in the Venezuelan democracy, sought to achieve
its political program through the simultaneous promotion of
social reforms (mainly a land tenure reform), through inspiring
the labor movement, and also through fostering an environment in
which the industrial sector could achieve progress. At the same
time, based on nationalistic principles, the state has been
progressively developing its natural resources.
As it became stronger through the success of the democratic
process, the state took further steps, nationalizing gas, oil and
iron ore mines. When oil prices increased dramatically, its main
beneficiary was the state and its administrators, who channelled
an important portion of these new revenues to their most prized
project, the development of the Guayana region. The return on
this investment was meant to be more than simple profit: it would
be a signal of the state's ability, within the context of a
democratic system, to provide a stable and prosperous economic
future for Venezuela. Thus, Guayana is the crucible of Venezuelan
democracy, a symbol and image of the democratic experiment. Its
progress is integral to the progress of democracy in Venezuela.
Venezuelan industrialization parallels the history of the
Venezuelan democratic process. The Guayana industrial program is
a manifesto of the decision to manage Venezuela's natural
resources, and the promise of a diversified economy.
2.1) Towards Democracy: 1936 - 1958.
2.1.1) Post J.V.Gomez-dictatorship: 1936 - 1945.
The period from 1936 to 1945 was characterized by an average
Per Capita Annual Growth of 7 per cent and an average annual Real
Gross Domestic Product growth of more than 3 per cent. This
moderate rate of growth was principally based on the dynamic
expansion of petroleum investments, production and exports.
After sluggish industrial growth Venezuela experienced in the
late 19th century, Venezuelan industrialization process gained a
renewed impetus in the second half of the 1920's and in the early
1930's. Researchers agree that an internal market was forming
during the period previous to 1936, due to the impact produced by
the development of the oil industry. This period also showed a
reduced contribution of agriculture, and its social consequences
(such as the growing migration from rural to urban areas).
After the death of the Dictator Juan Vicente Gomez, during
the presidency of General Lopez Contreras (1936-1941), the State
started to develop explicit policies on industrialization. In
1937 the State founded the Banco Industrial de Venezuela
(Venezuelan Industrial Bank), attached to the Ministry of
Development, which was geared to providing capital for industrial
activity within the country. During this period, the most
important sector was the commercial one, which was the initiator
of contacts with foreign capital and closely related to banking
interests. At roughly the same time (1936-45), the industrial
sector was slowly growing in size and economic power. It further
increased its volume and production capacity after 1940, when
World War II certainly spurred the expansion of industry in the
country.
Sonntag and de la Cruz (1985) have suggested that the
constant growth of Venezuela's internal market in the years
previous to 1936 provided the objective basis to start
formulating an Industrial Plan for Economic Development. Such a
plan would make lucrative certain economic activities that until
then had been only crudely developed. Authors Sonntag and de la
Cruz further suggest that the state seems to have understood the
expectations of the growing industrial sector, and in consequence
President Medina Angarita created a Production Council, whose
direction was put into the hands of the private sector and had
at its disposal 60 million Bolivars (Venezuelan currency 3.30
Bs/$ at that time) for industrial and agricultural investment.
This was one of the first verifiable measures of direct financing
of industrialization by the State. Sonntag and de la Cruz (1985)
also point out that Venezuela's industrial sector increased its
power but still experienced resistance from other areas,
especially the commercial sector. It would be several years
before the industrial sector would become dominant.
The industrial sector must be seen as a growing force which,
during this period, was becoming more clearly defined and
starting to make specific demands of the government.
2.1.2) The period 1945 - 1958:
During this period we will observe how the industrial sector
was battling with the commercial sector to achieve hegemony. Its
growing importance was vital in the attempt to establish a
democratic government, with the common goal of fulfilling the job
requirements. At the end of this period we will observe how
political leaders as well as the industrial sector came together,
collaborating in the effort to launch Venezuela into a new era of
democratic government.
The struggle for hegemony: 1945 - 1952.
The Government of Medina Angarita was overthrown on October
18, 1945, and replaced by a military-civilian junta led by
President Romulo Betancourt. During this political event, the
middle-income sectors, led by military officers and "Accion
Democratica" (the Social Democratic Party founded by Romulo
Bentancourt), foresaw a "political reappraisal of the National
Plan of the dominant class," which led towards "making industrial
development its goal, even when industrial activities did not
appear to be the most dynamic" (CENDES, 1981).
Researchers agree that the
1945 was mainly spurred by the
Accion Democratica (AD). The
perhaps Romulo Betancourt more
re-arrangement to stabilize the
representative democracy requi
planning. The private sector was
the commercial sector, and they
even reticent throughout the
participated in the conspiracy
1948 military coup and a new d
first democratic experiment of
middle classes and conducted by
leaders of that movement, and
than any other, understood that a
government and move towards a
red a redefinition of economic
still at that time controlled by
remained indifferent, skeptical,
three-year period, and finally
that culminated in the November
ictatorship, when a triumvirate
rise to power composed by M. Perez Jimenez, C. Delgado Chalbaud
and Llovera Paez.
During these three years of the democratic experiment, the
process of industrialization went beyond the initial phase of
implementation. This process was reinforced by the acceleration
of rural-to-urban migration that began in 1936. The growth
experienced was primarily in the production of consumer goods,
the same type of growth which would be recommended a few years
later by the development and industrialization policies of the
Economic Council of Latin America (ECLA). Clearly this was a type
of import substitution industrialization. For a better
understanding of the government's actions during this period, we
must review Betancourt's ideas.
Romulo Betancourt, leader of AD, recognized both that
industrialization and agricultural reform were necessary to
satisfy domestic demand. Understanding that the industrial
process would be a dependant to foreign capital with the implied
flight of national capital and the obstacles to developing a
national contciousness, for him the most important issue was
that industrialization would provide jobs. Also, he believed, oil
revenues would accelerate the industrialization process in
relation to other developing countries. Even though Betancourt
recognized the importance of the industrial process in progress,
this recognition was not enough to maintain AD in power. As we
mentioned before, the strong commercial sector ultimately joined
with the young military forces to conspire against democracy, in
a partnership whose strength was impossible for Betancourt and
Gallegos to overcome.
The most important measure taken during the civilian-
military government was the founding of the Venezuelan
Development Corporation (Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento - CVF)
in 1946. Regardless of the political regime, CVF was the most
important state entity financing industrialization. CVF's main
purpose was to implement the industrial strategy conceived in
Betancourt's economic plans, providing a channel of financial
resources from the central government to the Industry. Such
economic plans envisaged four steps for industrial development:
First, the promotion of basic industries
(principally energy) and consumer goods (import
substitution).
Second, the development of industries complementary
to the aforementioned.
Third, the developmnet of semi-heavy industry.
Fourth, the production of machinery and heavy
industry.
Of the 149 million bolivars handled by the Corporacion
Venezolana de Fomento (CVF) in this period, 89 million were
allocated towards financing industrial projects. This amount
represented 3.8 percent of the Gross National Income, 2.26
percent of which was for promotion of industrialization. However,
CVF was not the only entity in charge of financing
industrialization, others were the "Banco Industrial" and the
Ministry of Development itself.
The financing measures described above were flanked by
protective tariff and tax relief policies. In addition, during
this period the State began to participate more directly in
industrialization by investing in various enterprises, a tendency
that was to continue throughout the years of the dictatorship and
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intensify with the advent of representative democracy after
January 23, 1958.
The skepticism and distrust of the private sector towards in
AD's economic plan contributed to shaping the events of the next
several years. In November 1948 a coup d'etat preempted the model
of representative democracy built in 1945. Although with the new
regime the state became more rigid, the ensuing authoritarian
government kept in motion the economic development plan that had
been forming since the beginning of the 40's.
We have to emphasize again that the existing antagonism
between the dominant classes traditionally related to commerce
and land ownership, with an insurgent class promoting
industrialization. Because the state's acceptance of new national
objectives, proposed by those who were at the time committed to
the industrialization process, would signify a shift in resources
to those activities. State and industrialists encountered the
resistance of the other sectors: commerce and agriculture to the
proposed industrial plan. The struggle of those years was
precisely here: An attempted rapprochement between the civilian
leaders of Accion Democratica (AD), offering as a factor of
stability for the government the benefits of the incipient
industrialization to those who were able to undertake the task,
and the new industrialists trying to develop their industrial
plans, with traditional sectors (commerce and agriculture)
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resisting change. The message was transmitted but it seems that
the receptivity was not enough to maintain AD in power, perhaps
because other reforms such as "oil nationalization", agrarian
reform and various types of social reform announced by Romulo
Betancourt compromised the possible gains of the
industrialization process.
Although the Venezuelan state became much more politically
rigid during the dictatorship of Colonel M. Perez Jimenez that
followed the AD government, it should not be assumed that it was
incapable of modernizing itself. In fact, the State progressed in
its institutional structure, simultaneously allowing the
industrialization process to advance. It is mistaken in this case
to equate dictatorship with economic stagnation: the AD
government had been rejected, but the wisdom of its economic
goals remained clear.
The industrial plan in action: 1952 - 1958
The Perez Jimenez administration undertook the creation of
several Regional Development Banks to promote private
industrialization. As a result, the contribution of the
manufacturing sector to the Gross Industrial Product (GIP)
increased from 58.7 per cent in 1950 to 60.3 percent in 1957. At
the same time there was a decrease of the construction sector
from 38.1 percent to a 34.5 percent.
During this six-year period cumulated investments in
manufacturing surpassed investments in commerce. The
industrialists were gaining more and more power, particulary
since at this time international interest groups were investing
heavily in industry. The industrialization process was capital
intensive, increasingly dependent on the import of inputs and
machinery, and had a relatively high degree of oligopolization
and monopolization.
At the end of these six-years the State initiated a plan for
State capitalism; such a plan reserved for the State the
development of Venezuela's natural resources, especially mineral
resources, iron, steel, petrochemicals and the hydro-electric
power from the Caroni river in the Guayana region.
2.2) The period 1958 - 1973: Rise and decline of the political
pact.
This period extends from the installation of a democratic
government in January 1958 until the rise of oil prices (first
oil shock) in 1973. The new government led by Romulo Betancourt
promoted the use of the Import Substitution and Tariff Protection
policies in the national industries. These policies exhausted
their capabilities at the end of this period, but then the
government had at its disposal large financial resources steaming
from the first oil boom that postponed the crisis to a later
date.
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This period saw two consecutive AD (Social democratic)
governments and a final COPEI (Christian democratic) government.
The first two governments suffered from political instability
that ended during the COPEI government; this last government
arrived to power thanks to divisions within AD just before the
1968 elections.
The political pact.
On January 23, 1958, the dictatorship of Marcos Perez Jimenez
was defeated and replaced by a civilian-military junta which
promised to establish a representative democratic regime. The
private sector, guided by the industrialists and all the party
leaders, came together to launch a second democratic regime; the
main party AD was secure in the approval of the insurgent
industrial class. The process culminated, towards the end of
1957, in a meeting in New York, where capitalists and politicians
established a pact. Petroleum-based and international industrial
capital quickly sealed the alliance.
Three documents summarize the pact between the different
sectors: (1) The "Punto Fijo" Pact, (2) The "Statement of
Principles and Minimum Program of Government" and (3) the
Constitution of 1961.
In the 'Minimum Program of Government' all
parties agreed on a model of development which
gave the State the responsibility for economic
planning, development of infrastructure, the
pursuit of full employment, public housing for
the poor, and continuing improvements in
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health, education and social security. The
constitution did not call for the
nationalization of the oil companies or other
developers of Venezuelan natural resources; it
called instead for a limitation on further
concessions and for greater participation in
income. In addition it promised protection of
domestic industry against foreign competition,
and the support of domestic industry through a
development corporation.(Scott, 1986)
Democracy and the Economic Plans:
The young democracy faced a decline in oil investments by
international corporations. The development plan to be
established called for retaining the historical rate of growth,
which would be achieved through industrial development and
diversification and through substantial new exports (Ganz and
Blanco, 1969).
In addition, there was an urgent need for new productive
employment opportunities, since petroleum accounted for 25
percent of the Gross National Product but supported only 2 per
cent of the nation's employment. Venezuela was thus experiencing
the paradox of high unemployment in the midst of a booming
economy.
The Plans of 1963-1966 and 1965-1968 set ambitious targets
for economic growth, with fundamental changes in the structure of
production and employment (Sonntag and de la Cruz, 1985).
Production of goods and services were to rise at an annual rate
of 7 per cent. Industrialization was to provide the main elements
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for growth in production, productive employment opportunities,
and net savings for investment. Public investments were expected
to continue to support two fifths of the total industrial
development.
There were to be two main beneficiaries of this national
investment policy: The Venezuelan Development Corporation
(Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento, or CVF) and the Guayana
Development Corporation (Corporacion Venezolana de Guayana, or
CVG). The former (CVF), was to be responsible for following a
policy of import- substitution and the latter (CVG), for the
development of new a industrial center to produce enriched and
pre-reduced iron ore, metals, chemicals, and metal fabrications.
The subsidies promised (1957) to the private sector came
through the Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento. As was noticed, in
discussion of the previous period (1945-58), this office was in
charge of implementing the industrial strategy, providing
financial resources for new enterprises and coordinating tariffs
that implied a high level of protection to industry.
The Industrial State and the role of the Corporacion Venezolana
de Guayana (CVG).
Romulo Bentancourt had achieved the necessary consensus for
launching the new democratic regime; however, this time he
measured the possible consequences of the aggressive petroleum
policies of the past. It is probable that the Government that he
envisioned required a "leit motif" different from the one he had
postulated a decade before, which was the control of oil
exploitation. This necessary "leit motif" would be provided by
the development of the natural resources of the Guayana region as
a national enterprise.
The Guayana project was conceived as an integral part of the
Venezuelan National Plan, created to help achieve national goals
through the development of industry and power, and through the
construction of a city in what was virtually an empty space.
(Ganz and Blanco, 1969: 69).
The economic plans of the early 1960's predicted that new
industries would make up one-fourth of Venezuela's exchange
earnings by 1980. An important portion of these earnings was
expected to come from the Guayana region. This region, which in
1965 already accounted for 7.5 per cent of Venezuela's
manufacturing production, was counted on to provide one fifth of
Venezuelan manufacturing output and almost a fourth of an
expanded level of exports by 1980.
To accomplish such targets, the National Plans ("Planes de la
Nacion") of the early 60's called for 10 per cent of the nation's
investments, public and private, to be devoted to the Guayana-
region program in the period 1963-1966. The Guayana share of the
national investment was substantially greater than 10 per cent in
certain priority areas: 14 per cent of the investment in mining
and petroleum, 21 per cent in manufacturing, and 34 per cent in
electric power.
The main objective of the Guayana project was to transform
the basis of the national economy. This new economy was to be
based on heavy industry and power.
In the context of the resources available in
the Guayana region, and taking the specific
needs of and targets for the Venezuelan economy
set down in the national plan, the planners
designed a heavy industry complex with specific
targets and programs for the production of
steel, enriched iron ore, sponge iron,
aluminum, chemicals, pulp and paper, metal
fabrications, and electric power. The short
term (1965-1968) and the long term (to 1980)
regional development program was formulated
around this heavy industry complex. From the
beginning the major considerations in project
selection included (1) modern technology that
was related to Guayana's unique resources, (2)
domestic and export demand, (3) economic scale
to achieve competitive output and pricing, (4)
integration and complementation with the
Venezuelan economy as a whole, and (5) linkag-
es, external economies, and transportation fac-
tors.(Ganz and Blanco, 1969: 66).
The Guayana industrialization plan established the upgrading
of iron ore to enriched iron ore, sponge iron, and steel as
primary targets. Following this would be the development of
aluminum and pulp. These latter areas, however, had to be
coordinated with the development of electric power and forest
reserves respectively. Production of ammonia could take advantage
of the availability of nearby natural gas. Later on, the metal
fabricating industry could be linked to iron and steel
development.
As we have noted, the Guayana-CVG was a project of Accion
Democratica; during Betancourt's government, AD started Guayana
City, initiated the steel factory and constructed the bridge over
the Orinoco river. When the COPEI party came into power in 1968,
their leaders put a freeze on the development project. Basically,
they reduced the budget of CVG, while at the same time increasing
the budget for all the public enterprises controlled by CVG, such
as EDELCA, the company in charge of the Caroni river development
(see table 2.1). COPEI created a new platform for the development
of the Guayana region from the Ministry of Public Works (MOP).
This new program was called "La conquista del Sur" (the Conquest
of the South). The COPEI government thus converted an AD
Industrial Plan into an infrastructure program for the Guayana
region.
In the last five years of the period, between 1958-1973, and
during the COPEI government of 1968-1973, the import substitution
policies originated in 1961 finally exhausted their capabilities.
This was evidenced by a decrease in annual growth in
manufacturing industry. At the same time, in 1972, oil prices
experienced the first major increase. (see GNP table 2.2).
2.3) The period 1973 - 1983: Political Economy of Petrodollars.
TABLE 2.1 : COPPORACION VENEZOLANA DE GUAYANA M BUGET 1965 - 1976
( IN MILLION BOLIVAPS )
NATIONAL % OF TOTAL
INVESTMENT INVESTMENT
INSTITUT CVG EDELCA SIDOR Subtotal FROM THE
INV INSTITUT
------------------------------------------------------------------
1965 NA 86.9 70.0 103.1 260.0 NA
1966 NA 62.5 70.0 169.5 :302.0
1967 1,306.0 124.9 90.0 90.0 294.9 19-00%
1960 1,:388.7 124.3 30.0 90.0 234.3 16.00%
1969 1,494.1 122.9 45.4 25.0 193.3 13.00%
1970 1,306.5 128.7 5.0 NA 133.7 10.00%
1971 1,819.2 74.0 33.0 34.0 141.0 9.00%
1972 1,494.8 70.0 30.5 40.0 140.5 9.00%
1973 1,517.5 58.0 50.0 40.0 148.0 10.00%
1974 5,122.0 267.9 130.5 598.8 997.2 19.00%
1975 4,248.1 310.5 24.6 840.0 1,175.1 28.00%
1976 (Ley) 3,489.7 400.0 NA NA 400.0 11.00%
--------------------------------------------------------------
Total 1,777.9 601.9 1,970.3 4,350.1
23,186.6 (b) 4,787.1 16.00%(b)
-------------------------------------------------------------
(a) Including : "modificacion a la ley de presupuesto".
(b) Including 1967-1976 period
SOURCES: Ministerio de Hacienda, Direccion Nacional de Presupuesto.
en: Izaguirre, Maritza. "Cuidad Guayana y la estrategia
de desarrollo polarizado". Ed SIAP-Planteos
Table 36. Pg 90.
TABLE 2.2 : GROSS DOEsTIC PRODUCT AT MARKET PRICES BY SECTOR 1970-1983
Cbillions of bs st 1968 prices) (1).
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
~------------ ~--------------- ---------- ~------------------
TOTAL GOP 50.7 52.1 53.9 57.3 60.7 64.4 70.1 74.8 76.4 7?.4 75.8 75.6 76.1 72.5
2.762 3.45% 6.312 5.93% 6.10% 8.85% 6.70% 2.14Z 1.31% -2.07% -0.26% 0.66R -4.738
------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------- 
---------- -------------------------------------------
Petroleuw 11.2 10.6 9.7 10.3 9.1 7.1 7.2 7 6.9 7.4 6.8 6.6 6.1 5.9
-5.362 -8.492 6.193 -11.652 -21.982 1.41% -2.78% -1.43% 7.25% -8.11% -2.94% -7.582 -3.28%
---------------------------------------------------- ------------------- --------------- 
------------------------------ ------------------
Nonpetroleuw
PRIMRRY SECTOR
Agriculture
Crude petroleuw
Mining
SECONDRRY SECTOR
Manufacturing
Petroleum refining
Electricity and mater
Construction
TERCIRRY SECTOR
Comerce
Tranport and cow
Financial inst
Governwnet
Other services
Subtotal
Less imputed
bank charges
39.5 41.5 44.2 47 51.6 57.3 62.9 67.8 69.5 70 69 69 70 66.6
5.06% 6.51% 6.33% 9.792 11.052 9.77% 7.79X 2.512 0.72X -1.432 0.00% 1.45% -4.86%
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
-------------------------- --------
13.2 12.9 12 12.7 12.2 10.8 10.5 10.5 10.5 11.2 10.9 10.6 10.1 9.8
-2.27% -6.98 5.83% -3.94% -11.48X -2.78% 0.00% 0.002 6.67R -2.682 -2.75Z -4.72% -2.97Z
3.5 3.6 3.5 3.7 4 4.2 4.1 4.4 4.5 4.7 4.8 4.7 4.8 4.9
2.86% -2.78% 5.71F 8.11% 5.00% -2.38% 7.32% 2.27% 4.44% 2.132 -2.08% 2.13% 2.08
9.1 8.7 7.9 8.3 7.3 5.8 5.7 5.5 5.4 5.9 5.5 5.3 4.8 4.5
-4.402 -9.20% 5.062 -12.05% -20.55% -1.72% -3.51% -1.82% 9.26% -6.782 -3.64% -9.432 -6.252
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4
0.00% 0.00% 16.67% 28.57% -11.11 -12.50% -14.29 0.002 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -16.67% -20.002
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------ 
-----------------------------------
11.1 11.6 12.8 13.9 14.5 15.8 17.9 19.5 20.7 20.8 20.3 20.1 20.4 20
4.50% 10.34Z 8.592 4.32; 8.972 13.292 8.94% 6.15% 0.482 -2.40% -0.99% 1.492 -1.962
6.2 6.6 7.2 7.6 8.3 9.3 10.4 10.8 11.4 11.9 12.3 12 12.5 12.3
6.452 9.092 5.562 9.21P 12.05% 11.832 3.85a 5.56d 4.392 3.36% -2.44% 4.172 -1.60%
2 1.9 1.8 2 1.8 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.4
-5.002 -5.26Z 11.112 -10.00% -27.78Z 15.38% 0.00% 0.002 0.00% -6.67 -7.14a 0.00% 7.69%
0.9 0.9 1 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.9 2 2.3 2.5 2.7
0.00% 11.11Z 10.00% 18.18% 15.382 6.67% 6.25% 0.00% 11.76% 5.262 15.002 8.70% 8.00%
2 2.2 2.8 3.2 3.1 3.7 4.4 5.5 6.1 5.5 4.6 4.5 4.1 3.6
10.00% 27.27% 14.292 -3.13N 19.352 18.922 25.002 10.91% -9.84% -16.362 -2.17% -8.89% -12.202
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------
25.7 27.3 29.4 31.1 34.7 39.3 43.6 47.4 48.3 48.3 46.9 48.3 48 46.1
6.23Z 7.692 5.78% 11.58% 13.26Z 10.942 8.72% 1.902 0.00% -2.90% 2.992 -0.62% -3.96R
5.4 5.5 5.7 5.9 6.4 7.4 8.3 8.7 8.7 8.2 6.9 6.7 6.9 6.8
1.85% 3.642 3.51% 8.47P 15.63X 12.16v 4.82% 0.002 -5.?5% -15.859 -2.90% 2.99% -1.45%
5.2 5.5 6.1 6.3 7 7.7 8.7 9.6 10.4 9.9 9.8 10.2 10.5 8.8
5.77% 10.91M 3.28% 11.11% 10.00% 12.992 10.34M 8.332 -4.81% -1.012 4.082 2.942 -16.192
7.2 7.7 8.3 9 10 11.7 13.1 14.3 14.2 14.5 14 15.1 14.6 15
6.942 7.792 8.43% 11.11% 17.00% 11.972 9.16a -0.702 2.112 -3.45% 7.862 -3.312 2.742
5.1 5.5 6 6.2 7.2 7.9 8.6 9.3 9.4 10.1 10.5 10.6 10.6 10.4
7.84% 9.09% 3.332 16.131 9.72% 8.862 8.142 1.08% 7.45% 3.962 0.952 0.002 -1.89%
2.8 3.1 3.3 3.7 4.1 4.6 4.9 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.4 5.1
10.712 6.45 12.12% 10.81P 12.20% 6.52% 12.249 1.822 0.002 1.792 0.002 -5.26% -5.562
50 51.8 54.2 57.7 61.4 65.9 72 77.4 79.5 80.3 78.1 79 78.5 75.9
3.602 4.63% 6.46% 6.41P 7.332 9.26% 7.50% 2.712 1.01% -2.742 1.15% -0.63% -3.31%
1 1 1.3 1.6 2 3.3 3.8 4.7 4.8 5.2 4.8 5.7 4.9 4.8
0.00% 30.00% 23.082 25.00% 65.00% 15.15% 23.68M 2.132 8.33% -7.692 18.752 -14.04Z -2.042
Plus custows duties 1.5 1.3 1.1 1 1.5 1.9 2 2.1 1.? 2.4 2.6 2.3 2.3 1.3
-13.332 -15.382 -9.09V 50.002 26.672 5.26X 5.00% -19.05% 41.18% 8.33X -11.54% 0.002 -43.482
------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
-------- -------------- ------------------------------
Population (2). 11,632 12,665 13,119 13,590 14,071 14,562 15,024 15,485 15,940 16,394
8.882 3.582 3.59X 3.54% 3.42% 3.24X 3.07X 2.942 2.852
-------------------------- --------------------------------------- ---------------------------------- 
------ ------- ------------------------ ----------
(1) Source: Scott-Venezuela 1986 adapted frow Banco Central de Venezuela
(2) Source: Minister9 of Energy and Mines.
The election of Carlos Andres Perez of AD to the Presidency
in December of 1973 brought into power someone with the will to
innovate, delegate and spend. The now-rich government, thanks to
the rising oil prices of the early 70's, purchased the iron mines
from their foreign owners, and likewise the oil concessions. It
also provided the funds for a vastly expanded effort to develop
Venezuela's resource-based industries ("La Gran Venezuela",
launched by Perez), all through state-owned corporations.
The oil bonanza had an impact on the Venezuelan economy in
two waves, 1974 and 1980, which should be differentiated one from
the other. The first and decisive wave was channelled into the
Guayana program (see graph 2.1 indicating the jump in CVG
investments), and in consequence the hydro-electrical Guri dam
and the SIDOR steel plant were brought forward by more than a
decade. The aluminum smelter of Venalum was raised from 100,000
to 250,000 tons. New projects were announced, among them a 1
million ton state-owned alumina plant and a 3 million ton state-
owned bauxite mine. Investments in pulp, diesel motors, cement
and gold were discussed. The original 1965 projection for 1980 of
transforming the Guayana complex, not only into a center for
substituting imports of key industrial products, but also into a
major export center could now become a reality. The decisions
made during those years were based on projected exports of 3
million tons of steel, 200,000 tons of aluminum and 350,000 tons
of alumina, as well as many other products. Cement was to be
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provided for the construction of the Guri dam and electricity to
light the whole central area of the country. The main question
which arises from these projects and projections is, what has the
return of these investments been, and what is their actual
contribution to exports today?
2.4) The period 1983 - 1987: Crisis and devaluation.
This period is significant due to three major events which
took place at this time in Venezuela: the first devaluation of
the Bolivar in February 1983, presidential elections in December
1983 (which were won by AD), and a second devaluation of the
bolivar in December 1986, when additional exchange controls were
introduced.
The Venezuelan economy during this period remained stagnant,
as the GNP did not grow after 1980 (in December 1986 it was
announced that the non-oil sector grew 3.5 per cent during that
year). The crisis of this period is partially explained by
reduced private investment and flight of capital, consequences of
a lack of confidence in the economy, higher interest in foreign
capital markets (1980-82) and the overvaluation of the Venezuelan
currency (until December 1986).
Venezuelan unemployment is now the highest in forty years
(the Central Bank puts the figure at 12 per cent and the unions
argue that it is around 20 per cent), and inflation is also into
double digits. These figures are surprising after the annual
growth experienced from the early 50's until the mid-70's, when
Venezuela was seen as one of the few economic success stories in
Latin America. This state of affairs is not only serious because
of the economic recession it entails, but also because it
involves the very viability of the country's scheme of
development both political and economic. Venezuela's leaders are
responsible for having set over-ambitious targets and
miscalculated their implementation, and it is the Guayana project
which cast a shadow over these figures.
The drop in oil prices contributed to a large extent to
Venezuela's economic crisis, but this crisis appears to have had
its origins much earlier, involving most if not all of the
economy, rather than oil alone. Paradoxically, the decline
actually appears to have begun in 1978, during the period
referred to as the "oil bonanza", and to have continued despite
the second oil price rise; the fall of oil prices has only
accelerated the process.
It is important to note the strong economic performance in
the period prior to 1973, when non-oil growth was 6.5 per cent
per year in comparison to the period 1973-84, when it grew only 3
per cent. Examining these figures since 1978, we have a 1.1 per
cent annual growth. It is important to note as well that real
income grew more than 3 per cent prior to 1973, and rose briefly
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upwards from 1973 to 1977, only to sink in 1985 to lower than the
1973 levels. Private sector investment went off 75 per cent
between 1977 and 1982. The creation of jobs, which had averaged
about 150,000 per year in the 70's, fell sharply in 1978 and by
1983 was negative.
The private sector, with a utilized capacity of around 60 per
cent, since the first evaluation was demanding changes in order
to overcome the crisis. Some private groups had proposed a new
strategy. These groups asserted that if Venezuela wished to
regain its forward momentum, the government would have to abandon
its strategy of import substitution based on the State as the
engine of growth, in favor of a strategy which relied more on the
private sector, to achieve a more diversified group of exports,
notably manufactured exports. These initiatives are embodied in a
book, Proposal to the Nation (E. Quintero and others, 1985): the
proposed initiatives were to be supported by a sharp devaluation,
as well as reduction in protection and control of the domestic
industry, "to open a way for the creation of new, export-
competitive activities in manufacturing" (Scott, 1986).
The recent deterioration of oil prices (especially since
January 1986), the efforts made since 1983 to pay off foreign
debt, and the high demand for foreign currency at the
preferential rate of 7.50 Bolivars per US dollar established in
1983, combined to put enough pressure on the balance of payments
to motivate a new economic strategy and a second devaluation of
the Bolivar in December 1986. A new exchange rate of Bs. 14.50
per US dollar was established for all imports and exports of
goods and services, with some exceptions. (The Bs. 7.50/$ rate
remains unchanged for all imports and exports of the oil and
iron-ore industries).
This new exchange rate was supported by other measures in
order to reduce its effect on national investment, mainly the
foreign investment regulations which had been relaxed in order to
promote future foreign exchange contracts. The new laws gave
investors clear-cut guidelines on the exchange treatment to be
accorded to their investments and the remission of dividends
abroad.
At the same time, in order to stimulate domestic investments,
the Venezuelan Development Fund ("El Fondo de Inversiones de
Venezuela") had announced that it would finance certain private
investment projects through shareholder participation in mixed
enterprises, and open overall lines of credit for the financing
and development of specific high-priority sectors such as
agriculture, industry, and construction of tourist
infrastructure.
The effects of the most recent devaluation and the
implementation of some measures which were announced
simultaneously are a source of current debate. Pedro Palma, a
Venezuelan economist, gave a presentation to the Mason Fellows at
Harvard University (Kennedy School of Government) on March 14
1987 about the short term effects of such a second devaluation.
In his opinion, the devaluation would "generate earnings for
exporters and reduce those of importers". In Venezuela, the
principal exporter by far is the public sector, while the private
sector is basically a net importer. Palma's estimate indicates
that the recent measures would add approximately Bs. 35 billion
to the Central Government (principally originating from exchange
profits). The private sector would face a more difficult
situation, the new exchange rate reducing the bolivar earnings
from private exports and increasing the cost of imports and
foreign debt service.
In Palma's national accounts, he forecasts a positive balance
of 9,896 billion bolivars for the public sector and a negative
balance for the private sector of 35,295 billion bolivars. Even
if the government is capable of returning a large portion of this
transfer to the private sector, while estimating that the
government has at its disposal only 9.9 billion bolivars to
invest, the private sector will undergo a net loss of income on
the order of Bs. 25 billion. In order to continue stimulating
public spending in the internal economy at the levels of the two
previous years and to compensate for the transfers to the public
sector, the Government must provide some additional Bs. 20
billion or more. Such resources will have to come from new credit
sources in an amount equivalent to the country's pnlblic foreign
debt service outlays.
It is in this perspective that the Guayana project has a
national role to play. The Guayana region, under the
administration of CVG, is being offered as a channel for
investment and reactivation of the national economy, especially
in attracting foreign capital. In chapter 3 we will observe why
these required new investments tend to keep going to Guayana, and
in chapter 4 we will see how CVG is facilitating these transfers
to the region.
3) THE OUTCOME OF THE INDUSTRIALIZATION PROCESS:
As we have seen in the preceding chapter, it has become clear
that important changes are taking place in Venezuela at this
time, and new strategies must be provided in order to spur
economic growth. These new strategies must take into
consideration the relative positions of the main players:
government, state-owned enterprises, the private sector and the
labor force. The study of the industries associated with the
Guayana Development Corporation can't be separated from analysis
of the role of the other players.
In this chapter I have made a special effort to reexamine
Venezuelan industrialization from an economic rather than a
political point of view. This would help us to determine which
economic variables are more important for the analysis of
Venezuelan industrialization and to weigh the relative position
of the main players in the economic arena. Understanding which
are the more important economic variables will help us to define
the relative position of the players and will allow us to make a
better assessment of this case.
We can easily recognize that Venezuela has been a primary
exporter since the beginning of the century (table 2.2 provides
information for 1970-83). Today, as it was 25 years ago when the
industrialization process and the Guayana project started, the
economy is still highly dependent on oil exports. Why has
Venezuela been unable to reduce its dependence on oil revenues?
How has Venezuela performed in relation to other countries which
were primary exporters 25 years ago? How has Venezuela performed
in relation to other oil-exporters in the last decade?
Studying the experience of other developing countries may
help us understand the deficiencies of Venezuela's
industrialization process. For the developing world, "different
factors seem to suggest a balanced investment in heavy as well as
light industry and a reduced share of manufactured imports in the
gross national product". (Chenery, pg 2, 1986).
Venezuela, as we noted in Chapter 2, began its process of
industrialization under the influence of specific economic
theories. During the decade of the 50's Presbisch and Singer were
advocating industrialization in order to offset the supposed
disadvantages of specialization in primary production and the
associated secular deterioration in the terms of trade. This
ideology was based on two fundamental points: The clearly limited
world demand for exports of primary products and the rising
domestic demand for manufactured goods. These realities promoted
a general import substitution strategy among Latin American
countries that called for a balanced growth of the industrial and
primary sectors.
Venezuela, like other Latin American countries, practiced an
import substitution policy. It can be argued that such a policy
would conflict with the neoclassical concept of comparative
advantages, which suggests that Venezuelan advantages were in the
oil industry (World Bank report of 1961) or in iron related
industries as suggested after the appraisal of the Guayana
region. This economic concept of comparative advantages and the
progressive appraisal of the natural resource endowment of the
Guayana region has been tremendously influential among policy
makers during the entire democratic period.
Referring again to economic theory, any evaluation of an
industrial process must take into consideration not only the
natural resources available, or the allocation of human and
capital resources in order to exploit them or to produce
manufactured goods, but also the global changes in demand and
supply as ways of guaranteeing transfers of modern technology.
In addition, trade policies have proved to be an important
factor of economic growth among the more successful developing
countries. Venezuela can't escape the temptation of referring to
these successful countries to reexamine its industrial strategy.
What Venezuela must keep in mind is that these trade-oriented
economies have faced a completely different world economy and
have arisen from different historical backgrounds. The
international economy those countries dealt with in the period
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1950-70 was a world of expansive international trade. Venezuela
today faces a radically altered world, one where restrictions and
protectionism are the order of the day. For example, in recent
years the US and Spain have imposed a voluntary steel quota on
Venezuela.
The argument for shifting from an inward-oriented to an
outward-oriented strategy has been strengthened by the success of
a small group of "newly industrialized economies", particularly
by the four East Asian economies in this group: Hong Kong, the
Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan.
Although these successful outward-oriented policies have
received great attention in recent years, they have been only one
of several ingredients in successful development strategies.
Japan for example has been more notable for attaining a great
increase in productivity than for having a particularly open
economy (the "microchips-war" in March 1987 is a clear example).
Venezuela is different from these successful super-exporters
because it owns this natural resource endowment which includes
oil, iron ore, cheap energy, gas and others. The general tendency
of countries such as Venezuela, which have large resource
endowments and primary- exporter economies, is to follow
strategies of delayed industrialization, where, after a late
start, manufacturing increases rapidly in response to the growth
of domestic demand. It is important to notice that at the same
time Venezuela has the power to decide when to develop such
resources. The timing and scale of such resource base
developments would be a fundamental issue in the analysis of the
general development and industrialization of Venezuela. What was
in the hands of international corporations two decades ago, is
today in hands of many independent producers such as Venezuela.
In addition to natural resource endowments and trade, other
important factors such as the role of the Government and human
resources have also to be considered in evaluating the actual and
future capabilities of the Venezuelan economy.
We would expect Venezuela, like any other developing economy,
to experience structural changes in its economy during the
process of industrialization. In a neoclassical approach to
evaluating the industrial process, we would only focus in the
relative contribution of different sectors to total growth.
However, using a broader perspective, should further take into
account the failure to reallocate resources efficiently in order
to increase exports or replace imports.
STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION:
Structural transformation analysis takes into consideration
not only changes in agriculture, industrialization and
demographic transformation, but also incorporates the
transformation of demand, trade, production and employment into a
single framework. The structural approach focuses oA differences
among sectors of the economy which may inhibit equilibrium
adjustments in resource allocation as implied by neoclassical
theory. Neoclassical theory assumes that equilibrium is
maintained over time, which limits the sources of growth to
factors on the supply side. The evidence seems to suggest that
Venezuela is a good example of the failure to achieve an
efficient allocation of resources as implied by the neoclassical
theory.
In an equilibrium growth perspective as suggested by Chenery,
competitive equilibria that underline
neoclassical theory are a convenient starting
point for growth analysis because they permit
any group of inputs to be aggregate on the
basis of their marginal productivity (Chenery,
1986: 16).
In equilibrium growth theory, all primary inputs are
categorized as either capital or labor. Each of these can then be
consolidated on the basis of its share in the total product. The
difference between the growth of total output and the weighted
average growth of capital and labor serves as a measure of the
increase in Total Factor Productivity (TFP) for the economy as a
whole.
Comparative studies designed to measure the importance of
capital, labor and productivity, have been carried out for
several economies, including Venezuela. These studies indicate
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that the growth of capital, labor, and productivity are of
comparable importance for the whole, but vary significantly with
the structure of a specific economy and the effectiveness of its
policies.
In his comparative study of different economies, Chenery
analyzed the different contributions to growth; analyzed the
growth of outputs, inputs, and Total Factor Productivity (TFP);
and elaborated a table from which I extracted the averages given
for different groups of countries: developed, developing and
centrally planned economies. We can compare these values with the
Venezuelan figures.
Table 3.1
The Growth of Output, Inputs, and Total Factor Productivity.
TFP Total Factor
input
Economy Years Growth Growth Growth
value Growth share Growth share of of
added rate rate capital labor
(Gv) (Ga) (Gf) (Gk) (Gl)
Developed 5.4 2.7 49.0 2.7 51.0 5.2 1.1
Centrally planned 8.2 2.5 35.0 5.7 65.0 8.0 4.5
Developing 6.3 2.0 31.0 4.3 69.0 5.5 3.3
Venezuela 50-60 7.85 2.15 27.4 5.7 72.6 7.2 3.7
60-74 5.1 0.6 11.8 4.4 88.2 4.5 3.3
Source: Extracted from Chenery, table 2-2, (1986).
From the averages given, developed economies are
characterized by the small growth of labor inputs (1.1 per cent),
moderate growth of capital (5.2 per cent) and output (5.4 per
cent), and a relatively large contribution of TFP to aggregate
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growth (50 per cent). The developing economies, in contrast, have
a high growth of labor inputs (3.3 per cent), a higher total
factor growth (4.3 per cent) and a relatively small contribution
of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) to aggregate growth (30 per
cent).
The Venezuelan experience is remarkable in its relative
position between the countries studied. Figure (3.1) shows the
relationship between total factor productivity growth and total
factor input growth. We see here that the developed countries fit
within a smaller cluster, A, defined by relative low factor
growth , with TFP accounting for between 50% and 70% of overall
growth. Developing countries are divided into two clusters: the
large one , B is characterized by TFP growth between 0.5 and 2.0
percent. The smaller one, C, is composed of five developing
economies plus Japan, with aggregate growth (Gv) of more than 10
per cent. (See Figure 3.1). Venezuela stands with a total growth
of 5.1 per cent, where such growth was basically spurred by total
factor input growth (4.4 per cent), and where increase of TFP
contribution to total growth was practically insignificant (0.6
per cent).
Grouping the countries in those categories mentioned before,
and performing a regression analysis, we arrive at Figure (3.2).
It is interesting to note that both sets of regressions point to
the relative inefficiency of the growth processes of the typical
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developing country in cluster B (where Venezuela stands with one
of the lowest productivity rates). In terms of the production
functions represented in Figure (3.2) a typical developing
economy with relatively high factor input growth of 5 per cent
can expect aggregate growth of 6 per cent, whereas developed
countries or efficient economies predict growth of about 9 per
cent.
The question that immediately arises is, how do we explain
such inefficiencies in the Venezuelan economy? Having had an
important increase in its total factor input growth, why didn't
Venezuelan economy increase proportionally? Equilibrium growth
can't explain this imbalance.
Several factors suggest the importance of incorporating the
effects of disequilibrium into the study of Venezuela's growth.
The structural variables we should look to in explaining growth
rates are: (1) Reallocation of labor and capital; (2) Growth of
exports; (3) Capital inflows; and, (4) Level of development. It
would seem that one of these variables, or a combination of them,
can help us to explain Venezuela's disappointing performance.
The structural transformation approach used by researchers to
evaluate the performance of a specific economy proposes studying
the structural transformations of an economy in a time series.
This approach provides both the aggregate data available for a
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large number of countries and the detailed time series of
individual countries.
We can define the structure of an economy by its supplies of
productive factors - labor, capital and natural resources - and
their employment in different sectors. We can then define the
structural transformation of a developing country as,
the set of changes in the composition of
demand, trade, production, and factor use that
takes place as the per capita income increases.
A main thesis is that to understand country
differences in sources and rates of growth ,
the transformation as a whole must be analyzed.
More specifically, changes in demand and trade
may affect the sources of growth as much as the
changes in factor supply (Chenery, 1986: 32).
Cross-country studies between developing and developed
countries yield two general results: First, they identify several
aspects of structural changes that affect the rate of growth and
that have a varying importance at different levels of
development. Secondly, the structural factors in the cross-
country regressions are all more significant for developing
countries than for developed ones. Investment is the only source
of growth shown to be important for both groups.
In order to compare different countries, Chenery and his
colleagues have proposed to break down the supply-side analysis
by sectors first and then to combine it with a corresponding
breakdown of demand and trade. The result is a demand side view
of the factors leading to structural change and growth that is
consistent with the supply-side analysis.
An analysis of the Venezuelan economic structure and the role
of the Guayana regional economy in the global economy will
require the use of input-output analysis, which will describe
inter- industry relations. Including demand and production
functions which depend on relative prices, we will have a general
equilibrium approach as proposed by Johansen's 1960 study of the
Norwegian economy.
PATTERN OF TRANSFORMATION:
Growth processes of a developing country can be
best understood as a part of the overall
transformation of its economic structure. This
interdependence works in both directions:
income growth causes changes in the composition
of domestic demand and production, and
conversely, rising investment rates and the
reallocation of labor trend to increase
aggregate growth (Chenery, 1986: 37).
Taking into account both demand and supply analysis for
growth, and applying this approach to the analysis of a small
developing economy such as Venezuela, we would expect to see many
of the structural changes observed in other developing countries.
The most common feature of industrialization among developing
economies is the shift from agriculture to other, more productive
sectors, such as manufacturing. This process, which is always
related to urbanization, has been observed in Venezuela during
the last three decades. The Guayana project foresaw the
absorbtion of part of this global phenomenon. The urban
population has reached 80 percent of the total population in
recent years.
Another characteristic of Venezuelan industrialization is the
high level of its exports, and in consequence the high level of
its imports. This is a common pattern among small countries which
are rich in natural resources; they tend to have a high level of
trade and this high level of trade would tend to reduce with
population size increase. Increased income from favorable terms
of trade would shift domestic demand.
In the case of Venezuela, with respect to domestic demand,
one reason for changes in the productive structure is the decline
of the share of food in private consumption as income rises. This
shift in the overall pattern of demand allows all other
components to rise. In Venezuela, domestic demand definitely
increased after the first oil boom, and there is some evidence
that the second oil boom was absorbed mainly by increased demand.
After the effect of declining oil prices and the agricultural
policies which followed from this decline, agricultural prices
increased dramatically. We would expect domestic consumption to
be affected in such a way that the private capacity to save will
probably be affected; the capacity for private investment for
other sectors must also be diminished by implication.
A basic concept to be remembered in order to analyze the
Venezuelan industrialization experience is that industrialization
is commonly measured by the rise in the share of manufacturing in
GNP. In a general equilibrium context, as presented by Chenery in
his comparative study (1986), industrialization is a property of
the system as a whole, in which the fall in the share of primary
production is offset by a rise in social overhead as well as in
manufacturing. Generally the causes of the rise in manufacturing
differ considerably from those of the decline in primary output.
Venezuela is a good example of this independent process, with the
increase of primary exports we saw an increase in manufacturing,
as well as a decrease in the primary exports without an increase
in manufacturing. In today's world, unlike Presbish's world,
volatility also affects primary production.
As we have shown, Venezuela has comparative advantages in the
production of crude oil, energy production and iron related
industries, and we would expect that through import substitution
and the expansion of manufactured exports, Venezuela would move
away from the specialization in primary products that is
characteristic of early stages of development. Although the
tendency towards shifts in comparative advantages ultimately
affects all developing countries, their magnitude and timing vary
greatly. As we mentioned before countries with small populations
such as Venezuela have relatively specialized economies and a
high share of trade in GNP, and we would expect that trade share
to decline markedly with increasing population.
In a country like Venezuela, with access to large amounts of
natural resources, the way in which these resources are exploited
has a substantial impact on the country's comparative advantages.
To show the importance of size and resource endowments in
trading patterns, Chenery and Syrquin proposed a two-way
classification of countries, based on their population size and
their relative specialization in primary or manufactured exports.
The typical small and primary-oriented economy such as
Venezuela's, seems to maintain a strong comparative advantage in
primary exports'throughout the transformation of its domestic
demand, while exports make little or no contribution to the rise
of industry. In these cases industrialization is largely the
result of increased demand produced by rising income. The shift
in the composition of output with rising income reflects the
reallocation of labor and capital from primary production to
manufacturing and services. In a dynamic analysis of the
structural transformation of this type of economy, manufactured
imports are replaced much more slowly. The comparative advantages
in primary production delays the development of manufactured
exports.
TYPOLOGY OF INDUSTRIALIZATION.
In the comparative analysis presented by Chenery (1986),
special emphasis is placed on trade strategies rather than
internal policy (resource mobilization). This emphasis leads to a
three-way classification pattern of specialization (large - L;
small, primary oriented - SP; and small, industry oriented - SM).
This typology of semi-industrial economies recognizes the effect
of structural features such as size and resource endowment as
well as trade policy.
If we take trade policy into account, we can say that
Venezuela is an outward primary-oriented economy, taking as
evidence the importance of primary exports in total exports.
Following a policy of industrial protectionism, Venezuela has
tried to accelerate growth while at the same time making exports
earnings entirely dependent on primary products. The negative
impact on the industrial share in output associated with the
enormous rise in the price of energy in the 1970's (Dutch
disease) will be apparent in Venezuela.
Chenery (1986) points out that, "development strategies try
to accelerate growth either through increasing the supply of
labor and capital, or through a more efficient use of resources".
As we noticed before, Venezuelan growth is explained basically by
the labor and capital input growth, where TFP has had an
insignificant contribution to growth. Chenery and his colleagues
constructed figure 3.3 to show how trade strategies could be
associated with differences in levels of efficiency, and the
relative importance of growth in factor inputs, and the
importance of efficiency in explaining differences in growth
rates among countries. Using both time series and cross-country
estimates of sources of growth, the efficiency of an economy is
measured by the difference between its observed growth rate and
that predicted from the growth of its factor inputs. This
comparative analysis shows us that Venezuela is not only below
the average efficiency of the entire sample but also below the
group average (I) of the inward oriented economies. In short, the
relative efficiency of the Venezuelan economy in relation to what
could have been expected from its factor inputs growth is very
low.
To aid explaining the differences in sectoral sources of
growth between countries, it has been established that the
principal sectoral sources of growth are: shifts in final demand,
increased use of industrial products, and shifts in comparative
advantage away from primary production. In case we are concerned
within Venezuela, as in other primary-oriented economies,
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manufacturing uniformly contributes less to growth than is
typical for other countries at the same income level. "But the
inhibited effects of the growth of primary exports on
manufacturing (the Dutch disease) are outweighed by the
accelerated growth of domestic income". (Chenery, 1986: 99).
Timing also will affect virtually all aspects of development
strategy. As in the Venezuelan case, "the exploitation of natural
resources for exports tends to slow down the development of other
tradable goods" (Chenery, 1986: 99). If this is a general
tendency, we can imagine what will happen if the exploitation of
those natural resources is done in excess of the estimated
requirements.
TRANSFORMATION OF PRODUCTION IN VENEZUELA.
Because industrialization is characterized by a rising share
of manufacturing in the production, exports, and employment of
the tradable sectors, the figures shown concentrate on these
dimensions.
Figure 3.4 Figure 3.5
Per capita value added Per capita exports
primary products vs manufacturing
Transformation of production and exports during period 1953-73.
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Ve~nezuela's transformation (1953-1973) is particulary
characterized by a large increase in per capita value added in
manufacturing (see figure 3.4). At the same time, Venezuela has
maintained a constant structure (value added) in its production.
But for the same period it seems that Venezuela has intensified
its per capita value added in primary products in comparison to
the average for small-primary exporters (dotted line SP), which
shows a shift toward higher manufacturing shares of production,
exports and employment. This bias in Venezuela's case is
explained by increasing dependance on oil revenues that
intensified after 1973. Due to improved terms of trade for
primary exports (oil), the composition of exports in Venezuela
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has temporarily reversed the tendency to shifts towards
manufactured exports. (see figure 3.5).
In general we observe a somewhat slower transformation of
production in primary oriented countries such as Venezuela, and a
rapid transformation in most of the manufacturing-oriented
countries. The mentioned slower transformation among primary-
producers is known as the "Dutch Disease" (DD). Venezuela is not
exempt from this phenomenon. In 1973, Venezuela had a tremendous
capital inflow (10% of 1972 non-oil GNP) that could have spurred
a corresponding GNP growth. In order to explain why this didn't
happen, we have to observe where Venezuela invested the income
from its oil exports. This case is important because the success
of the OPEC oil cartel is not paralleled by any of the primary-
producer countries.
The first objective in order to evaluate the importance of
the "windfalls" produced by higher oil prices is to divide the
economy between mining and non-mining, rather than oil and non
oil segments. This approach is proposed by Alan Gelb (1986).
Following table 3.2, Gelb gives us an indication of the base
absorbtion structures of seven oil economies and compares them to
Chenery-Syrquin norms for countries at a similar level of non-
mining income per capita. Venezuela, Iran and Algeria "with large
and long-established oil sectors", stand out as the most mineral-
dependent. The breakdown of extra absorbtion indicates
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particulary strong investment biases in Algeria, Venezuela and
Trinidad. What kind of investment biases is Gelb referring to,
and how important are they in relation to the entire economy?
Table
Composition of absorbtion: 1970-2
3.2
in relation to the Chenery norm
Algeria Ecuador Indonesia Iran Nigeria Trinidad Venezuela
Pri C
A/N-M 64.5 75.5 83.5 72.2 80.2 80.9 62.8
Norm 66.0 68.0 75.0 64.0 70.0 78.0 62.0
Pub C
A/N-M 18.0 10.6 9.8 23.4 8.6 n.a. 16.4
Norm 14.0 14.0 12.0 14.0 14.0 n.a. 15.0
Invest
A/N-M 40.8 20.6 17.5 27.0 22.1 31.0 36.6
Norm 20.0 19.0 15.0 22.0 17.0 22.0 23.0
Absor
A/N-M 123.3 106.7 110.9 122.7 111.0 119.0 115.8
Norm 100.0 101.0 102.0 100.0 101.0 100.0 100.0
Breakdown of extra absorbtion (%)
Pri C -6 132 96 36 102 24 5
Pub C 17 -60 -25 41 -54 n.a. 9
Inves 83 28 28 44 51 76 86
%oil/ex 79 77 51 90 82 78 91
A/N-M = Actual /non-mining GNP
%oil/ex = Share of oil in
exports (1972).
Source: Gelb, Alan. (1986), Table
Pri C =
Pub C =
Inves =
2.3
Private consumption.
Public consumption.
Investment.
The Venezuelan oil windfall of 1974-78 represented 11 per
cent of Venezuela's non-mining GNP, while the oil windfall of
1978-81 represented 8.7 per cent. After 1979, slower real growth
of oil sectors reduced the impact of the price windfall. Figure
3.6 indicates the average time profile during 1973-1981 of the
windfall as measured above for six countries, expressed relative
to their non-mining economies each year.
Figure 3.6
The oil windfall and its use , 1973-1981. (Unweighted average:
Algeria, Ecuador, Indonesia, Nigeria, Trinidad and Tobago, and
Venezuela
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Source: Gelb, Alan (1986), figure 2.1.
In Venezuela, the impact of the oil windfall was reflected in
fiscal revenues, and we find that central government revenues
jumped from 25% of non-mining GNP to 36%. Total revenues in terms
of the percentage of non-oil GNP accrued to the government
progressed as follows:
From 25.2% in the period 1970-72, to
42.1% in the period 1974-1978, to
36.3% in the period 1979-1981.
Public oil income in Venezuela had led the state's role to gain
importance over a long period of time. As in the case of other
oil exporters, Venezuela experienced an "unparalleled growth in
the size of the public sector after 1973 and this sector most
experienced a considerable extension of its role, towards direct
participation in industrial production". (Gelb, 1986).
In this chapter we have sought for a better sense of how to
explain the success or failure of Venezuelan industrialization.
The evidence shows us that in spite of having had tremendous
capital inflows, Venezuela did not use them efficiently to
further its economic growth.
Two main explanations for this problem can be advanced:
First, that exchange rates made manufacturing non-competitive and
promoted flight of capital. Second, that policies regarding
utilization of capital inflows were mistaken; the figures suggest
that such investments were placed principally in energy-
production, steel and aluminum -- all of them over-concentrated
in the Guayana region -- without allowing resources for other
sectors. Although non-oil private investment boomed in Venezuela,
increased investment was overwhelmingly public. In the period
1974-78 public investment absorbed about half of windfall
surpluses. In the next period of 1978-81, the use of windfall was
generally similar except that private consumption increased at
the expense of domestic investment.
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As predicted by the Salter-Swan neoclassical model (Gelb,
1986), exchange rates appreciated, and with the shift in
production structure towards the non-traded sectors, dependence
on oil for foreign exchange increased. At the same time, we can
expect that "the impact of higher public spending on growth may
be low if the quality of investment projects declines with
accelerated spending" (Gelb, 1986: 76).
The impact of expanded investment on Venezuela's growth has
been, at first glance, disappointing compared to the record of
other oil-producers, as we see in the table following:
Table 3.3
GROWTH TRENDS (%) in the oil exporters, 1967-81.
Non mining Domestic Goods and non-factor serv
GNP investment Exports Imports
67-72 72-81 67-72 72-81 67-72 72-81 67-72 72-81
Algeria 9.5 8.6 17.7 10.8 5.7 (1.0) 11.6 10.8
Ecuador 4.7 7.6 3.2 10.2 15.9 6.0 6.0 9.7
Indonesia 8.5 8.2 24.3 13.0 15.7 4.3 16.7 19.1
Iran (a) 10.1 13.3 10.2 21.1 12.9 (0.3) 17.7 23.7
Nigeria 9.2 5.3 (b) 8.7 (b) (4.2) (b) 15.3
Trinidad 5.3 5.4 6.1 9.3 2.5 (6.5) 6.6 8.4
Venezuela 6.5 5.1 11.9 3.5 (1.3) (8.7) 7.7 12.8
MEAN (d) 7.3 6.7 12.4 9.3 7.7 (1.7) 9.7 12.7
Middle 5.8(c)5.1(c) 8.2 5.6 6.7 4.0 7.4 1.5
income oil importers
(a) 1967-72 and 1972-7
(b) Deflated data unreliable before 1970.
(c) GNP
(d) Excluding Iran
Source: World Bank in Alan Gelb's "Adjustments to windfall gains"
On average, real private consumption and public investment
were larger than public consumption in the period 1974-78. For
the next period a further rise in consumption aggregates implied
a substantial cut in investment. The non-oil growth performance
of Gelb's example was exceptional in the 1967-72 period. At 7.3
per cent, it was some 1.5 per cent higher than the average growth
of GNP in middle income developing countries. Also, average non-
oil growth after 1972 was still 0.6 per cent more rapid than oil-
importing developing countries through the favorable period the
1970's.
In the case of Venezuela non-oil growth was 6.5 per cent
during the period 1967-72 and 5.1 per cent for the period 1972-
81. During the latter period economic growth was the same as the
average for middle-income countries, and it should be noted that
domestic investment for the period 1972-1981 was on the average
3.5 per cent not only lower than other oil producers but also
lower than middle income oil importers.
As we studied before, in examining Chenery's comparative
analysis of developing countries, growth in income is associated
with a shift from primary production to industry and services,
and later on from the sectors conventionally considered as
tradable -agriculture and manufacturing- towards services and
construction. In table 3.4 we can see that Venezuela had one of
the most severely skewed economies in sectoral terms before the
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oil price rise, that is skewed in terms of the size of the
service sector (67 per cent in 1972).
Table 3.4
Sectoral Structure. Initial conditions 1972.
Alger Ecuad Indone Iran Niger Trinid Venez
A N A N A N A N A N A N A N
Agriculture 11 25 23 26 45 46 22 18 39 38 6 16 8 14
Manufacturing 16 20 20 19 11 11 18 25 5 15 22 26 19 27
Construction 13 5 5 5 4 3 6 6 11 4 8 6 6 7
Services 60 50 52 50 39 40 53 51 45 43 64 52 67 52
(MI) 18 4 2 4 12 6 28 3 15 5 9 2 20 2
Source: Gelb (1986). pg 81. A = Actual N = Norm (Chenery, 1975)
Venezuela, with Algeria and Indonesia, managed to strengthen
their non-oil tradable sectors. These three countries also
managed to raise domestic food and agricultural supplies. Despite
a policy objective of reducing oil-dependence, non-oil exports
contracted on average 1.7 per cent annually during the period 72-
81. Venezuela, Nigeria and Trinidad did not experience a sharp
decline in agriculture and manufacturing.
As we noted several times before, Venezuela, like most of
the countries studied by Gelb, channelled windfall gains into
petrochemicals and heavy metals, as well as developed transport
and communications systems. Public projects tended to be large
and complex and frequently were highly capital-intensive (see
following table).
Table 3.5
Macroprojects in oil-exporting countries (a).
No.of Cost Aver. Cost Cost Rank Hydro Metal Other Infra
Country proj. Cost 1980 1980 amo. carbon Ind. struc
($b) ($m) GNP wind devel. ture.
fall countries.
Iran 108 119.6 1,107 1.57 10.2 2 30 7 9 54
Algeria 69 38.7 561 1.07 4.2 5 36 7 33 23
Venezuela 27 27.4 1,015 0.51 5.4 10 33 41 7 19
Mexico 59 26.0 441 0.18 5.1 .2 46 17 12 25
Nigeria 19 14.4 758 0.17 0.9 15 26 11 16 47
Indonesia 44 14.4 327 0.23 1.1 16 41 18 16 25
Trinidad(b) 7 6.9 983 1.35 4.5 -- 61 29 -- --
(a) Projects with costs exceeding $100 million.
(b) Gas-based industrial projects only. Includes Tenneco-Midcon
LNC project proposed for 1988.
(c) 1977 GNP and oil windfall.
Sources: Murphy (1983) table 2.5; Auty and Gelb (1984) and table
2.13 in Gelb's "Adjustments to windfall gains" (1986).
Venezuela's investment program placed heavy emphasis on
metals (steel and aluminum), representing five times its 1980 oil
windfall or half its 1980 GNP. Where are these investments?
Principally in the Guayana region. Why have those investments
accumulated in this region?. The answer to this question was
partially put forth in chapter 2, where we studied the linkages
between the Accion Democratica party, which was the recipient of
the first and decisive oil windfall, and the Guayana Development
Corporation. In my opinion these huge investments previously
described set the precedent of the current large investments in
the region (Black-hole effect), which in turn caused
institutional arrangements within CVG in order to achieve the
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industrial support required by the industries already in place.
This restructuring will be the focus of chapter 4.
4) CORPORACION VENEZOLANA DE GUAYANA (CVG):
In order to understand fully the significance of this
chapter we should briefly recapitulate what we have seen thus
far.
Chapter Two covered the following points: First, we outlined
the progress of a successful import substitution process, from
the end of the 40's up to mid-70's, and how this model seems to
have become exhausted. We also saw how the Venezuelan government
and industry collaborated during the democratic era. Second, we
observed how the government, in an attempt to diversify the
Venezuelan economy and balance economic growth in the country,
launched the Guayana development. We noticed the ideological
linkages between AD and Guayana's development, the latter
becoming a strong image for the former. The linkages between
Guayana and AD explain the large investments in Guayana since
1973. Third, we observed the current situation of the Venezuelan
economy, where the Government is faced with reduced incomes and,
in its urgent necessity to reactivate the economy (no real growth
from 1980 to 1985), it seeks investment from private or foreign
investors or through added new debt. These additional investments
have many prospective clients who wait a share in these scarce
new funds: the state-owned enterprises which require more
investments in order to get out of the red, and the private-
sector partners.
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Later on, in the third chapter, we took note of the
importance of the investments made in the heavy metal industries
complex of Guayana in relation to the gains from the oil price
increases. These investments help explain why Venezuela has
performed so poorly in comparison to many other developing
countries.
In this chapter I will explain how CVG is implementing an
import substitution industrial strategy designed to support the
installed industrial complex. This is not an simple import
substitution policy for consumer goods as it was in the 60's.
This time CVG is attempting a more difficult and delicate one:
the substitution of industrial inputs and capital goods for this
complex. For this next period, CVG is depending on the
participation of the private sector, but the private sector has
alternative investments and distrusts having the state-owned
enterprises as a principal client.
This key variable of alternative investments for the private
sector is the dilemma that CVG has to solve in order to promote
the integration of the state-owned enterprises with the private
sector. This chapter will investigate the steps CVG is taking to
accomplish this delicate task. In doing so we must remember that
the expectations in 1965 for the Guayana region in 1980 were that
it would be a main export center. With this in mind we will then
enter into the conclusions of this thesis with regard to
Venezuela's economic crisis.
4.1) Introduction.
The implementation of CVG's new industrial objectives cannot
be fully understood without presenting the internal restructuring
of CVG and the evolution of its previous goals within a
historical framework.
4.1.1) Original Objectives:
The Guayana Development Corporation was created by
presidential decree No. 430, enacted on December 29, 1960, in the
form of an Autonomous Institute of the Venezuelan State, attached
to the Office of the President of the Republic. Said decree
assigned to the CVG the following objectives:
a) To study the resources of Guayana, both within the zone of
development and outside of it when required by their nature.
b) To study, develop and organize the exploitation of the
Caroni river's hydroelectrical potential.
c) To program the development of the region in accordance with,
and within the scope of, the National Plans.
d) To promote the development of the region in both the private
and the public sector.
e) To coordinate the economic and social activities carried out
in the region by various official organizations.
f) To contribute to the organization, planning, development and
operation of the public utilities required for the
development of the area.
g) To carry out, by fiat of the National Executive, any other
task which may be connected to operations outside the zone,
in cases where there exists a close relationship to those
being performed within the zone.
4.1.2) Goals:
The activity of the Guayana Development Corporation is set
out by the guidelines of the VI National Plan and by Decree of
Regionalization No 478, which expanded the spatial scope of the
action of the Corporation to the Federal Territories of the
Amazon and Delta Amacuro. In this sense, CVG participates in the
formulation, coordination, and evaluation of plans and programs
and in the execution of projects related to physical
infrastructure, urban regulation, mining, agricultural and forest
developments, promotion and execution of technical improvements
and training programs.
According to Decree number 2, issued by the Presidency of
the Republic on February 2, 1984, CVG is entrusted with the
coordination of the State enterprises located in the Guayana
region. It was necessary to amend its organic statutes to adapt
its organization and operation to this new mandate. To this end,
CVG work through two kinds of managerial units: the enterprises
and the Office of the Vice President for Development. Through
these two units, CVG fulfills its responsibilities: the integral
development of the region, the coordination of the public sector
agencies and the coordination of the State Enterprises.
4.1.3) Industrial Development:
The Guayana region has at its disposal of resources which,
by their variety and quantity, are ideally suited for the
development of a good part of the industries needed by the
country for a first rate development:
a) Abundant water, both for the production of energy and for
industry, navigation, agriculture and human consumption.
b) A port, capable of handling an intense river traffic of more
than 700 ships per year, through the use of the existing
wharves in Cuidad Guayana.
c) High content of iron and bauxite ores as well as other
minerals; abundant and low-cost hydroelectric power, oil and
gas in the neighboring Eastern region which includes the
Orinoco bituminous oil belt, and the most extensive forest
reserves in the country. Moreover, its advantageous location
on the Orinoco navigation channel gives products from
Guayana a ready access to international markets.
The Guayana program was conceived as an important
contribution to the diversification of the Venezuelan economy by
means of the development of an industrial complex based on these
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extraordinary resources, and this is its main objective. A second
goal consists of the creation of a pole of development, in
competition with Caracas and other cities of the country, as a
center of attraction for population, so as to lead to a more
balanced national development and to incorporate into the
Venezuelan economy an immense region which, although historically
important, has remained underpopulated and practically marginal.
When speaking of the Industrial Development of Guayana, one must
take into account that it has been oriented not only towards the
national market, but also towards the full realization of its
export potential.
To reaffirm the importance of the Guayana program, it
suffices to mention the investment plans carried out during the
1975-1979 period both by the public sector and the private
sector, which exceeded 42 billion bolivars. The Plan IV steel
production expansion represents by itself only a 15 billion
bolivar investment while the investment in the aluminum
production increase amounted to 3.5 billion bolivars. These are
only to quote two outstanding examples, without mentioning
investments in specialty steels, ferrosilicons, cements, forging,
castings and other products.
The 240 meter drop of the Caroni - which is Venezuela's
second largest river - in its last 210 kilometers before its
confluence with the Orinoco river, represents a hydroelectrical
potential of more than 17 million kilowatts, one of the largest
of any river in the world.
A general perspective of the main achievements and plans of
CVG is given in table (4.1).
4.2) Organizational evolution.
CVG has progressed from a corporation in charge of an
industrial program, to a Regional Development Corporation and
coordinator of the State enterprises located in the Guayana
region. Since its creation, the Corporation had gone through
various stages; at the beginning it was mainly in charge of the
development of the Caroni River hydroelectrical plant, the steel
plant and the new city. During the last Christian Democratic
Government (1978-83), CVG suffered from a certain degree of
financial constraints. One reason for these financial constraints
may be that the Guayana project has never been a priority for the
leaders of this party. This is demonstrated by the actions of the
Ministry of Public Works in the previous Christian Democratic
government, which was mentioned in Chapter 1. Having no political
support, CVG had three different Presidents during that
government (1978-83).
The reduced income from the oil industry has moved public
opinion against the actual government. As we noted, the resources
TABLE 4. 1
* ** *.* *** * *.*:** *.**** ** * **** * **** * ** * ************** *** ** * *** ** **** ***
GUAY ANA DEVELOPMENT CORPORAT ION (CVG)
Program of developments
RESOURCE FOR 196) FOR 1986 FOR 2010
ENERGY Macagua I Guri Bajo Caroni
3.60 000 KW 10,000 MK Macagua II
Tocoma
Caruachi
18,000 MK
ALUMINUM Non existant
STEEL Sidor
1, 000, 000 tons
GOLD
WOOD &
PAPER
Free explotation
Free explotation
OR INOCO Chanel up to
Pto. Ordaz
Ferry boat between:
Bolivar-Monagas in
Los Fajardos
Bol :i var-Anzoategui
in Soledad
CARONI Utilization of
hydroelectric
resot..trces
Ferry boat betwwen
Pto. OrdaZ y San Fel
Capac i ty
40).())C) tons
Si dor
4,800., 000 tons
Pellets
6,600 , 000
Direct reduction
4 , 00C) 000 tons
Mi nerven
1., 500 Ks.
Caribe pine
1 90., 000 Has.
Pulp plant proj.
Widening of the
chanel to Pto
Ordaz
Widening and
signalization
of the chanel from
Pto. Ordaz to el
Jobo (BauXiven)
Widening
hydroelectric
resources
i x
2nd plant +
3th complex
Capacity
2, 000, 000 tons
Si dor
4, 800, 000 tons
Pellets FMO
10 , 0v0,00 tons
New modul -recov.
5, 500, 000 tons
Minerven new plant
& ref of 3,000 Ks.
Caribe pine
400, 000 Has.
Pulp plant CTMP
200, 000 tons.
Pulp plant Kraft
200,000 tons.
Lumber mill
Bux iven project-
terminal P. Ordaz-
El Jobal project
Navegation:
- Middle Orinoco
- High Orinoco
- Apure - Orinoco
Widening
hydroelectric
resources
URFJAN Inteoration of
urban centers.
Roads
Ferv boats
INTRA-- Ferry boat:
REGION - Rio Aro
- Rio Caura
- Rio Cuc:hivero
Railroad:
- El Pao-Palua
- Piar City-PtoN
Or d a
System af roads
and avenues
Bridges:
- Two bridges over
Caroni river
Widening of road
Highways:
C. Bolivar-P.Ordaz
S. Felix-Upata
Fery boats:
Rio Caura
R. Cuchivero
Bridges:
Rio Aro
Rio Caura & Rio
Cuchivero (const)
Bridges R asphapt:
El Dorado-S. Elena
Caicara-Pto Ayacuchc
Widening of
road system
Angosturita bridge
(mix vial and rail
Express system
between S.Felix-
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to achieve economic growth at the State's disposal are the public
industries (basically oil and the Guayana complex) and the
private sector (industry and agriculture).
The new AD government (1983-1988) has again given priority
to the Guayana project, and some changes have been made in order
to increase CVG's autonomy in relation to the executive branch of
government. One of the major changes made in 1984 was the
decision that the President of CVG will also be a Minister of the
Government. This means that the President of CVG will report
directly to the President of Venezuela, bypassing previous
difficulties that a rose when CVG was subordinated to the
Ministry of Development. At the same time, CVG coordinates the
State enterprises located in the Guayana region, since some of
the state-owned enterprises had major equity participation by the
Venezuelan Development Fund (for example, Alcasa).
At present, after the institutional changes and the
renovated political commitment to the Guayana project, funds are
coming directly from the Inter-American Bank and the Venezuelan
Development Fund through the Industrial Credit Fund (FONCREI).
These resources have been principally addressed to the aluminum
industry, for projects such as the opening and exploitation of
the "Los Pidiguaos" bauxite mine, the expansion of the aluminum
smelters of ALCASA from 125,000 to 200,000 tons, and the
amplification of VENALUM from 250,000 to 400,000 tons.
4.3) New leadership - Leopoldo Sucre Figarella.
Now that Lepoldo Sucre Figarella has become the new leader
of CVG, the corporation will pursue its goals to advance from
mere promotion of an industrial park to acquiring responsibility
for the development of the entire region and coordinating all the
activities. Figarella, whose leadership skills are indisputable,
is a native of the Guayana region. His family are descendants of
a group of Corsican families who have played a strong role in the
economy and leadership of the region from Bolivar City (Ciudad
Bolivar) through its history. Figarella was also Minister of
Public Works throughout the AD period from the dictatorship until
the Christian Democratic government of 1969-1973. This position
provided him with local support and the support of the national
technocracy. His leadership since 1983 is evident in the rapid
achievements and broad-based local support for the regional
programs. The institutional changes achieved and the financial
resources set aside for the region since 1983 are examples of
Figarella's executive abilities.
4.4) Recent economic objectives:
There is no doubt that the Guayana region must play an
important role in the industrial reactivation of Venezuela in
order to keep pace with the new job requirements added each year
and even to absorb some of the present unemployment. The region
offers the resources (principally natural resources) to help
achieve a diversified economy, which may reduce dependence on
oil.
The decline of oil revenues and the economic situation that
promoted devaluation in 1983, have obviously required a
reexamination of the national industrial strategy. In terms of
the Guayana region, the first available document from the CVG
redefining the industrial strategy came from the previous
government, nine months after devaluation and one month before
new elections. The new strategy proposed:
- Linking the basic industry to the medium and small
industries.
- Reducing the vulnerability of basic industry by import
substitution.
- Expanding present regional development to include new
territory.
- Use of industry to take advantage of the primary sector.
- Complementing the industrialization process with a
commercialization process.
Linking basic industry to medium and small industry.
At the end of 1982 CVG was aware that commercial and other
industries were closely related to basic-industry activity. The
fact that such a dependency between the two exists does not
necessarily mean that it is a correct model to follow. At the
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time it was projected that harmony would occur when small and
medium size industry produced the majority of the inputs required
by basic industry.
Reducing the vulnerability of industry by means of import
substitution.
The next step in industrial promotion results from the
opportunities which arose when the bolivar was devaluated.
Currently, it could be cheaper to produce locally some of the
inputs for industry. Large amounts (60 per cent) of inputs to the
Guayana complex were imported in 1982, and the first challenge
was to reduce such imports. For example, the aluminum industry
will no longer import as much bauxite, once the development of
the bauxite mines is completed (BAUXIVEN).
Integrating regional development with regional spatial
development.
The industrial process in the Guayana region must not only
take advantage of the large resources of the region but also
promote the extension of this development to marginal areas, even
those regions where there is no significant State presence. For
these reasons it seemed necessary to flank the economic and
financial decisions with considerations of regional strategy.
Use of the industry in the development of the primary sector.
This was understood as the development to a certain degree
of agriculture and agro-industry, and also the development of
certain organizational models for the exploitation of precious
minerals in an industrialized and profit way.
Complementing the industrialization process with a
commercialization process.
The purpose of this step was to establish support for those
industries which, because of their size, could not develop a
commercialization process themselves. Its goal was to allow such
industries to place their products abroad. In this way, the small
and medium sectors will benefit even though they do not have
their own international sales organizations. At this time the
import substitution model started to show the possibility of
exports.
4.5) Division of Industrial and Mining Promotion (Gerencia de
promocion Industrial y Minero).
Especially after the devaluation of 1983, the strategy
explained previously, needed a channel for its implementation. In
consequence the division of Industrial and Mineral Promotion was
created (or reformulated its previous goals).
One of the first ideas developed by this division was to
create an information service to be used by all of CVG,
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especially by the industry promotion division itself and to be
offered to the public (SIDI or Servicio de informacion para el
desarrollo industrial). Such an information system was designed
to cover the following subsystems:
1) Access and information recovery.
2) Aluminum (SIMA); including all the information related to
Bauxite, alumina and aluminum.
3) Industrial inputs (Subsistema de insumos industriales SII).
4) Legal information (Subsistema de informacion legal SIL).
5) Financial information (Subsistema de informacion financiera
SIAF), related to mechanism, financial entities disposable for
industrial promotion.
6) Industrial projects and information register (Subsistema de
informacion y registro de proyectos industriales). This subsystem
includes a project bank which was initially the Industrial
Development Division. This bank has now become public. At that
time, an initiative to identify potential new industrial projects
called project-ideas was also promoted to consider the
characteristics of the region and to take advantage the
potentially become industrialized.
Also, the Division of Industrial Promotion proposed a
serious effort to initiate an industrial input survey, not only
covering basic industry, but also the whole industrial complex of
the region. All these new ideas led to the promotion of the
Division of Industrial and Mineral Promotion (Gerencia de
promocion industrial y minero) as the responsible agent for the
new strategy in the government.
4.5.1) Import substitution committee and the promotion of new
industries:
There will be two focuses of the new division: first, import
substitution for the Guayana complex, and second, promotion of
new industries. In the context of Guayana, the trade-off between
import substitution and export-oriented industries is a crucial
issue. Most of the actual effort by CVG is oriented towards the
appraisal of the input requirements of the Guayana heavy
industrial complex. The corporation is collaborating with other
state-owned enterprises such as PDVSA (oil corporation) in order
to measure an aggregate demand and develop a coordinated import
substitution strategy in such industries.
The CVG objective is that the industries which they will
promote, could have a certain export capacity. In other words,
the state has defined certain areas where private investors can
obtain definite guaranteed sales to CVG industries, and from
there excess capacity can be transferred to exports. Even though
there have been no policies for specific export industries, some
export industries have appeared. What does not seem to be defined
is a strategy for promoting export oriented industries per se.
4.5.2) Import substitution committee:
Since the first attempts to evaluate the demand of basic
industry, there has been resistance from the purchase departments
of the Guayana industries to the provision of requested
information about the inputs; such complaints have come
principally from the Regional Chamber of Private Industries.
These private industries increased their claims when devaluation
(1983) made evident the necessity to produce locally the basic-
industry input. The private industries demanded information in
order to address their efforts to supply the requirements of
basic industry. The reality is that the import substitution
policy since 1983 in the Guayana complex has had relatively
little success.
It is from this perspective that we must analyze the import
substitution strategy for the Guayana complex. In September 1985
the Import Substitution Committee (Comite de Sustitucion de
Importaciones) was created with representatives from all of the
CVG industries. This committee's principal goal is to coordinate
actions in order to achieve a progressive and effective import
substitution. The committee's main goals were determined as:
1) - Diminishing the dependency on foreign supplies of raw
materials, machinery, equipment, spare parts and technology.
2) - Joining efforts to diminish the negative effects
related to the flight of foreign currency.
3) - Contributing to the increase of the private industrial
park, through consolidation of the installed facilities and the
creation of new investment opportunities.
In 1986, the achievements of this committee could be summarized
as follows:
- Creation of a unique register of
suppliers, in order to achieve common
technical standards for imported inputs.
- Disseminate the import substitution
policy.
- Evaluation of metal-related industries
installed in the region, in order to estimate
their capacities for import substitution.
- Exchanges among the different import-
substitution committees in the different CVG-
industries.
- Evaluation of the progress/status of the
import substitution program for each CVG-
industry.
- Development of product specifications for
common products in the basic industries.
- Presentation of a list of project-ideas
to the "Gerencia de Promocion Industrial".
- Presentation of the achievements to
different governmental agencies, chambers of
commerce, PDVSA (oil corporation), and
Engineers' professional association.
- Establishment of guidelines for an
information register for each industry.
- Utilization of common experience and
specific information to evaluate common
objectives, such as qualification of
suppliers.
- Organization of a forum with local and
national entrepreneurs interested in import
substitution.
- Support of a special South-West trade
(Guayana-Andean) for the experimental
transport of metallurgic coke to the Guayana
complex via the Orinoco river.
- Establishment and utilization of a
continuous process of providing information
among national agencies in order to
facilitate information on the exchange of
common objectives and experiences.
- Provision of a list of requirements for
parts and pieces actually imported to the
local chambers of commerce.
- Attendance by the import substitution
committee and the personnel of the basic
industries at a presentation organized by
PDVSA to present the unified register of
PDVSA-suppliers to the oil and petrochemical
industries.
- Coordinate meetings with the CVG-
Corporative Planning Vice-presidency and the
import substitution committee, for the
purpose to analyzing import substitution
problems and studying possible alternatives
to advance in the process.
4.5.3) Identification of new investment opportunities, promotion
of new industries and the implementation strategy.
The promotion of new industries can not be seen separately
from the implementation strategy. As was noted before, at the
beginning of 1983 CVG initiated a compilation of the project-
ideas that the Corporation had accumulated since 1960 and decided
to amplify this project-idea-register (pre-investment). Then,
with the creation of the Industry and Mineral Promotion Division,
CVG selected seven of the largest Venezuelan engineering
consulting companies (Inelectra, Technoconsult, Vepica, Otepi,
Marshall y Asociados, Cavein, and Proyecta) and proposed the
financing of feasibility studies to be done by one of these
companies (sharing the expenses and the risks).
Once the project-idea is identified, the consulting company
makes a proposal for a feasibility study at market prices. Once
an agreement on such a study is achieved, CVG then gives 50 per
cent of costs of the study to the consulting firm. The other 50
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per cent is covered by the consulting company. The modality
practiced by the consulting firm is not important to CVG; CVG
places capital and the firm can participate with its labor,
utilities, or money. Then, if the study is favorable, the
consulting company will be a stockholder in the new industry.
This project-idea does not have to come exclusively from CVG, it
can come from any source.
The most important result is that in this way an efficient
use of the local "know-how" is guaranteed, because no one else
has a better understanding of the national engineering capacities
than these firms.
This practice manages to combine two worlds,
one with the financial resources and one with
the resources of information and "know how"
(Interview with Rafael Pena, Manager of la
Division de Promocion Industrial y Minero,
January 1987).
This practice was well received by the Consulting firms,
most of them having been in precarious situations prior to this
initiative.
In 1984 CVG signed two important agreements: One with
CORPOINDUSTRIA (in charge of promoting medium and small
enterprises) and the other one with FONCREI (Industrial Fund).
The interest of these agreements is to reinforce collaboration
between CVG and the small and medium size industries, and to
grant resources to the Guayana region. Such agreements were
previously accorded with the Venezuelan Development Fund. Also,
71
collaborative activities were undertaken between CVG, CI and
other industries without formal written agreements. Examples are
the industrial park survey realized in 1986 and the exchanges
with the Industrial Chamber of the Zulia region.
After all this effort on the part of CVG, which is the
outcome of the strategy of import substitution, the next table
gives us the value and quantities substituted in by the different
enterprises:
Table 4.2
Results in the process of import substitution in
CVG's state owned enterprises.
1983 1984 1985 1986
Concept A B A B A B A B
Quantity (1) 503 - 964 - 2,538 3 3,514 6
(accumulated)
Amount (M bs) 74 119 190 312
at Bs 7.5/$ $9.9 $15.9 $25.3 $41.6
at Bs 14.5/$ $5.1 $8.2 $13.1 $21.5
increase 60% 60% 64%
(1) Quantity of inputs substituted.
A = Material and spare parts B= Raw materials
Source: Committee on Import Substitution (1986).
Firms: Sidor, Venalum, Alcasa, Interalumina, Fesilven, and
Ferrominera del Orinoco (Iron ore mines).
This table is the only information available to evaluate
theaction of the new strategy. The information provided is
useless since we can not refer to the total amount of imports to
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evaluate the success or failure of the policy. Knowing that CVG
industries are capital intensive, with large amounts of foreign
technology, and judging the action of the import substitution
committee and the new industrial strategy by these numbers, it
would seem that the substitution has been quite modest in real
terms. In my understanding, the actual implementation appears to
be somewhat effective. But even though the implementation might
be the right one, that does not mean that the strategy itself is
correct; again the question is, at what price we are going to
substitute ? Are we certain that these inputs are going to be
produced cheaply in the country?
Assuming that the amounts substituted are not significant,
we can explain the failure of this strategy in one of three ways:
(1) the strategy is so recent that it hasn't had time to show
results; (2) the strategy has not been directed towards solving
the main problems confronted by the goal to be accomplished
(import substitution); (3) it is a right implementation but a
wrong mandate (import substitution).
Exploring the second and third options together, we saw that
CVG industries were oversized and the logical interest of CVG is
to reduce foreign dependance in its industries; at the same time,
the private sector is mainly interested in export-oriented
industries. This will explain why CVG is not promoting export-
oriented industries and why the private sector is not
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collaborating more intensively with the government in import
substitution. Also, this strategy suggest to me that the
Venezuelan government is entirely biased towards capital
intensive industry development against light manufacturing. This
preference for capital intensive industries was acquired in its
relation with the oil industry, where it was easy for them to
allocate the resources among a few industries, and reap the
benefits from one or two of them.
74
5) CONCLUSIONS:
How should we analyze the performance of Guayana's
industrial program? We can express our evaluation in political
terms, in economic terms, in financial rentability or in social
terms.
Starting with the political approach, we can say that CVG
played an important role in the strengthening of AD and in the
democratic process. A strong government, in turn made a strong
CVG possible; when conditions permitted the government was
generous with the program. Today, even with scarce resources the
state is giving additional funds to the CVG program. If the
period 1974-79 was biased towards the Guayana Industrial program,
today this tendency is maintained.
Even with the political support enjoyed by the Guayana
program, what are the financial and economic gains of the
investments accumulated there? We should first look at the
proportion in which Guayana is contributing to total exports and
compare these figures with projections made in 1965. The figures
provided by IMF (table 5.1) show that oil still contributed 91
per cent of export earnings, although in 1965 planners promised
that the Guayana region would account for 25 per cent of exports
earnings by 1980.
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I have made an estimate of actual investments and how they
relate to actual exports. The total accumulated investments in
Guayana are 70,000 mm Bs, which equals 16,3 billion US dollars.
From this total 45,000 mm Bs were spent in the 1974-79 period
distributed in the following way:
Steel (Plan IV Sidor) 15,000 mm Bs / $3,5 billions
Aluminum 3,500 mm Bs / $0,8 billions
Electricity 30,213 mm Bs / $7,0 billions
- Guri Dam 22,019 mm Bs I $5,1 billions
- Transmission 8,194 mm Bs I $1.9 billions
These figures are the ones normally provided by CVG;
overruns suggest higher amounts.
In relation to power generation, EDELCA, the operator of the
Caroni River hydroelectric dams of Macagua and Guri (1OMK), is
not covering the power generation costs. The Guri dam expansion
decided on during the oil bonanza optimistically assumed domestic
demand doubling every six years, but the dam is now being
utilized at mere 60 per cent capacity mainly for problems in the
construction of the distribution system.
In relation to the Aluminum industry we can say that the
original investment estimates for the three aluminum projects was
$1.2 billion (Auty, 1986) that would have an value added of $400
millions. However, the implementation of those projects doubled
the capital cost, eroding competitiveness of all plants. Despite
the experiences of the first expansions, further growth is
foreseen in order to absorb additional Guri power.
As for steel, the worst investment, the planned expansion
from 1 million to 15 millions tons over the period 1975-1990 has
been contained at the present capacity of 4.8 million tons
provided by Plan IV. This design capacity reached 2.32 million
tons in 1983, and today, eight years after the initiation of the
expansion, output has yet to reach half of the 4.8 target
despite an expenditure of -$ 5 billions, which represents an
overrun of 50 per cent.
We can easily say that the Guayana development has
temporarily drained the diversification possibilities of the
country. And there is a risk that such tendencies will remain
through the current industrial strategy of import substitution
and vertical integration of the industries in place. For example,
we can mention the following current investments to be directed
towards the region:
ALUMINUM:
Bauxite mines total cost $460 mm (2)
foreign exch. requirements (IDB) $108 mm (2)
ALCASA
- Expansion 120 m to 220 m ton $640 mm (1)
- 5th line of smelter $720 mm (1)
- Purchase of Belgian mill $15 mm (1)
VENALUM
- 110 m ton expansion ?
- Purchase of US downstream facilities. ?
CONARE, wood industry development $86 mm (2)
foreign exchange req. (IDB) $34 mm (2)
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EDELCA, expansion of electric syst. $1,750 mm (2)
foreign exchange req. (IDB) $350 mm (2)
TOTAL $3,671 mm
Orinoco Bridge 1,500 mm Bs. or $100 mm (3)
Sources: (1) EIU, Venezuela Country report No 1, 1987.
(2) Interamerican Development Bank.
(3) El Universal, Caracas. Assuming 14.5 Bs/US$
Assuming that these will be the final costs and that they
will not be overruns, we can see that once oversize investments
in energy production are in place, all related industries (steel
and aluminum) become oversize in consequence. The steel industry
ambitioning 15 million tons. The aluminum industry pursuing
forward linkages, and minimum sizeable plants pushed up the size
of the entire chain (aluminum smelters, alumina production and
bauxite exploitation). From a minimum of 3 million tons for the
bauxite mine, CVG is immediately tempted to increase alumina
production. Making less questionable further increase in alumina
production, and in consequence aluminum.
Other reasons for the voracity of the Guayana region are:
One, the miscalculation of cost and scheduling in the
implementation process, due to a lack of adequate international
partners and the overconfidence of the local ones. CVG's state-
owned enterprises are characterized by a very low level of
participation of foreign capital that will would provide modern
technology and efficiency during the implementation phase, and
would compensate for domestic gaps in technical, managerial and
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marketing skills during plant operations. Second, a similar
overconfidence in the stability of high oil prices, which led our
policy makers to think that the development of Guyana was
justifiable even at high costs, because there would always be
available funds derived from oil exports.
The most dramatic element at present is that, in my
understanding, the private sector prefers to participate with the
oil sector instead of investing in joint ventures with CVG, in
spite of the great emphasis that CVG is giving to the
implementation of an innovative import substitution strategy.
The new exchange measures taken by Venezuela since 1986 and
the improved climate for foreign investments (Nov 1986) might
improve the actual trends, but there is no doubt that the success
of the new strategy will depend on convincing of the private
sector the opportunities offered by CVG.
We can easily see through this thesis that the Venezuelan
industrial strategy (1973-87) is based on a few capital-
intensive, resource-based industrial projects. This strategy of
resource base industrialization was inefficient and concentrated
in Guayana; preventing resources from diversifying in smaller
projects or in other manufacturing industries. I am convinced
that I gave sufficient reasons to explain why that happened,
mainly the political input in the decision making process that
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launched overambitious targets, "overestimating the potential
benefits and underestimating difficulties" (Auty, 1986).
It is clear to me that a major political input was vital to
the launching of the Guayana project and that without this input
it would have been impossible to create this completely new pole
of development, building an entirely city which now houses and
employs half a million inhabitants and scores of industrial
plants. However, the time has come for a changing of the guard:
the political component in the decision making process must now
give way to a managerial style less encumbered by the political
power accumulated by the Venezuelan government.
It is not merely a question of the government stepping back,
it is also that the private sector must step forward and assume
responsibility for the future growth of the Venezuelan economy.
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ANNEX 1.
List of interview realized in Ciudad Guayana and Caracas.
ALCASA:
Martinez, Celestino - President.
Rodriguez Pulido, Rafael - Vicepresident for Marketing and
Development.
Hermoli, Victor - Construction Division.
Escobar, Victor Hugo - Proyect of extension.
BANCO DEL ORINOCO:
Useche, Aurelio - Vicepresident.
COMISION PARA LA REFORMA DEL ESTADO (COPRE):
Gabaldon, Arnoldo - President.
Sosa, Carlos - State Enterprises.
CORPORACION VENEZOLANA DE GUAYANA:
Presidency:
Arreaza, Roberto - Vicepresident.
Gerencia de Promocion Industrial y Minero:
Pena Alvarez, Rafael - General Manager.
Vicentelli de Mago, Elba
Ing. Suarez, Veira
Ing. Ortiz, Daniel
Soc. Sanz, Maria A.
Lic. Morillo, Marbelia
Gerencia de Planificacion fisica:
Chemello, Andres - Gerente General
Oficina para el nuevo puente sobre el rio Orinoco:
Delgado, Maria Engracia.
INTERALUMINA:
Ing. Robles - President.
SULFORCA:
Monteverde, Jose Antonio - Site engineer.
List of interview realized in Cambridge.
Sosa, Carlos - February 3th, March 18th, 1987.
HARVARD INSTITUT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (HIID):
Auty, Dr. Richard - March 17th, March 30th, 1987.
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ANNEX 2
List of abbreviations
AD. Accion Democratica, Social Democratic Party.
ALCASA. Aluminum smelter, previous a 50%-50% joint venture
with Reynolds Aluminum.
BAUXIVEN. CVG-Company in charge of the exploitation of
bauxite mines of "Los Pidiguaos".
CONARE. CVG-Company in charge of the exploitation of the
planted Cariba pine areas in Monagas State.
CARONI. River, that cross Ciudad Guayana.
COPEI. Christian Democratic Party.
CORPOINDUSTRIA.
Institut in charge of developing small and medium
size enterprises.
CVG. Corporacion Venezolana de Guayana.
CVF. Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento.
ECLA. Economic Council for Latin America.
EDELCA. CVG-Company in charge of the development of Caroni
river Hydroelectricity. Macagua I & II, Guri dam.
FONDO DE INVERSIONES DE VENEZUELA.
Fund created to invest the oil windfall.
FONCREI. Industrial Fund (Fondo de Credito Industrial).
IDB. Inter-American Development Bank.
INTERALUMINA. Interamericana de Aluminios. Alumina producer.
MINERVEN. CVG-Company in charge of the exploitation of "El
Callao" gold mines.
SIDOR. Steel producer. Participation of CVG.
VENALUM. Aluminun smelter. Joint venture Japan-CVG-Fondo de
Inversiones de Venezuela.
